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Chapter Eleven
Sustaining Trident
Nuclear Absolutism and Nuclear Symbolism
Nick Ritchie
Nuclear weapons exist in a unique discursive realm. Their value rests on an
abstract logic of nuclear deterrence that can be neither proven nor disproven.
Numerous security logics, identities, and outcomes can be discursively as-
signed to these weapons and can, over time, constitute deeply embedded
“regimes of nuclear truth”.1 These regimes channel and circumscribe how
and what we think about nuclear weapons. In Britain, the continued deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons is justified as essential to the nation’s security. The
United Kingdom must invest in another generation of strategic nuclear weap-
onry to protect the state and its people, so the narrative goes. The formal
script from Whitehall propagated by the mainstream press is one of “nuclear
absolutism”: nuclear deterrence works, nuclear weapons are essential to UK
security now and for the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons are part of who
we are, nuclear weapons are safe and benign, and any consideration of relin-
quishing them is totally irresponsible.2 Absolutism is a marketing necessity
when it comes to nuclear weapons given their extreme destructive capacity,
the exceptionalism of their possession and potential use after Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, and the inherent challenges of justifying a system of indiscrimi-
nate nuclear violence in a democracy—what Daniel Deudney calls “nuclear
despotism”.3
Nuclear weapons are not developed and deployed easily or on a whim.
They are the product of executive decision making and the assembly of a
large coalition or “actor-networks” to produce, manage, and deploy the Unit-
ed Kingdom’s nuclear warheads and ballistic missile submarines. Recruiting
and sustaining the necessary organisations, technologies, industries, ideas,
narratives, and institutionalised understandings into a nuclear actor-network
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is a major national undertaking.4 It entails substantial resources, ideological
commitments, and the potential for massive nuclear violence that must be
publicly justified, and “nuclear absolutism” is the means. It is a narrative
deployed to convince doubters and waverers to continue to base UK security
on a blunt instrument of terrible violence. It is a “conventional wisdom” that
masks contingencies, risks, and realities in the name of national security and
reproduces a particular form of British militarism. The political imperatives
for nuclear absolutism in the United Kingdom are perhaps stronger than
elsewhere given the persistent public debate on retaining or relinquishing
nuclear weapons. Framing nuclear weapons as absolutely essential for the
security of the state and society and articulating an expansive set of values
and roles for UK nuclear weapons forecloses a more nuanced and realistic
appraisal. A nuanced assessment that foregrounds the many contingencies
and risks associated with nuclear weapons could potentially tip the political
and public balance in favour of their abandonment. Whitehall’s nuclear stal-
warts do not want that.
This chapter outlines and challenges the nuclear absolutism of govern-
ment narratives that seek to justify the United Kingdom’s continued deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons well into the twenty-first century. It argues that
everything about nuclear weapons is contingent and contested and that a
clear understanding of these contingencies is an essential part of debate. It
then highlights the power of nuclear symbolism in shaping how we think and
act in relation to Russia and Putinism after the annexation of Crimea. It does
so by challenging the seductive response of matching Russia nuclear re-
valuation with our own and NATO’s in the context of an evolving and
complex relationship between Russia and Europe. The chapter aims to go
beyond binary platitudes that say Trident is either worth nothing or worth
everything to “national security”. It seeks to question what we think nuclear
weapons provide us as a national community, how nuclear weapons condi-
tion our conceptions of security, and whether we should change what and
how we think about them. Without critical questioning, the electorate risks
supporting a hugely expensive and controversial programme on a false secur-
ity prospectus based on nuclear absolutism and nuclear symbolism.
IDEALISTIC NUCLEAR CERTAINTY
Government and their supporters justify British nuclear weapons because
they are seen to provide essential and legitimate security benefits to the
United Kingdom. They are essential because of the risk of future nuclear
threats that can only be deterred through a counterthreat of nuclear retalia-
tion. They are deemed legitimate because the 1968 Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty recognises the United Kingdom as a Nuclear Weapon State and
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because the United Kingdom considers itself a “force for good” in the world
eager to pull its weight in reproducing a particular global security order. We
saw this most recently in Chancellor George Osborne’s proclamation in New
York that “Britain has got its mojo back” and is “reasserting itself on the
world stage” following the vote in the House of Commons to join the bomb-
ing campaign in Syria against ISIS.5
British nuclear weapons are justified as an essential component of UK
national security: we cannot and must not live without the capacity to threat-
en massive nuclear violence against other states and societies. These weap-
ons are essential because we cannot know the future and therefore we cannot
rule out a scenario in which the United Kingdom’s own nuclear threat pro-
vides existential salvation by successfully deterring an adversary from
launching a nuclear attack against it. Because we can imagine such a scenar-
io, then we had better keep nuclear weapons just in case. As the Labour
government’s 2006 White Paper put it, the inability to “accurately predict the
global security environment over the next 20 to 50 years” means any form of
nuclear or broad strategic military threat cannot be ruled out.6
This is framed as an “insurance policy” that ensures protection of the state
from nuclear attack. In fact, the theme of “future uncertainty” and retention
of a nuclear capability as an essential “insurance” against strategic risk has
defined government narratives on replacing the current Trident system.7
Blair was quite clear in the foreword to the 2006 report that
we believe that an independent British nuclear deterrent is an essential part of
our insurance against the uncertainties and risks of the future [and that] an
independent deterrent ensures our vital interests will be safeguarded.8
The report insisted that we must retain our nuclear weapons just in case
because we cannot “predict the nature of any future threats to our vital
interests over the extended timescales associated with decisions about the
renewal of our nuclear deterrent”.9 Necessity and insurance in the face of
uncertainty is the justificatory theme. Prime Minister David Cameron, who
has repeatedly asserted that UK nuclear weapons are “the ultimate insurance
policy against blackmail or attack by other countries, adopted this mantra.
“That is why I believe it is right to maintain and replace it”.10 His favoured
Trident sound bite is “Trident is the ultimate insurance policy, in an unsafe
and uncertain world, that we can never be subject to nuclear blackmail”.11
Britain must keep its nuclear weapons as an “insurance” or a guarantee of
protection against future strategic threats to its “vital interests” in an uncer-
tain and complex international security environment in which nuclear weap-
ons may continue to proliferate.12
This paints a picture of UK nuclear weapons as providing assured, neces-
sary, responsible, and benign protection through the practice of nuclear deter-
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rence. Nuclear deterrence is portrayed as a certainty in an uncertain world.
Nuclear weapons successfully deterred the Soviet Union during the Cold
War, and they will unproblematically deter other adversaries for as long as
necessary, including a revanchist Russia (see chapter 14).13
REALISTIC NUCLEAR UNCERTAINTY
Nuclear weapons are not a form of insurance or a guarantee or protection.
The practice of nuclear deterrence is not a science but a set of military,
political, and cultural interactions involving bureaucratic-military systems
capable of inflicting supreme violence. There are fundamental uncertainties
associated with the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. These chal-
lenge and undermine its “system of logic, conceptualisation and bureaucratic
truth”.14
Proponents of nuclear deterrence argue that it prevented another major
industrialised war after the horrors of World War II. It is the massive, imme-
diate, and incontestable destruction of a nuclear war that induces caution into
interstate relations in times of crisis.15 A UK nuclear deterrent threat could,
of course, be decisive in future nuclear crises by inducing precisely this sort
of caution and restraint. That cannot be ruled out or in anyway disproven.
But it is not an automatic outcome of the deployment of nuclear weapons.
The success of nuclear deterrent threats is not a foregone conclusion but is
heavily context specific. It is based on the perceived credibility of the threat,
the political will to use nuclear violence given perceived interests at stake,
the ability to convincingly communicate the will to act to an aggressor, an
accurate understanding of how a particular aggressor can be most effectively
deterred, and a decision by an aggressor to be deterred.16 This is further
complicated by the increasing complexity of nuclear deterrence. If successful
deterrence requires some understanding of an adversary’s motivation, world-
view, resolve, and cost-benefit calculus, then successful deterrence is becom-
ing more difficult as the type of actors, capabilities, cultures, contexts, and
intentions evolves and expands.17 Total confidence in the efficacy of a nucle-
ar deterrent threat is becoming increasingly idealistic.18
An assumption of uniform rationality leading to caution and stability in
strategic relations requires what James Lebovic describes as “heroic assump-
tions about the adversary—its ability to think dispassionately, process infor-
mation, and make the ‘right’ decision under the most challenging of condi-
tions”.19 This can lead to misunderstandings, miscalculation, or determined
resistance to deterrent threats.20 The Cold War nuclear confrontation was not
the stable, predictable relationship of assured destruction it is often portrayed
as today. It was highly dangerous, plagued by uncertainty, and fuelled by
worst-case assumptions and planning with very serious risks of a deliberate
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or inadvertent cataclysmic nuclear exchange.21 General Lee Butler, former
head of America’s Strategic Command, stated in 1998:
While we clung to the notion that nuclear war could be reliably deterred,
Soviet leaders derived from their historical experience the conviction that such
a war might be thrust upon them and if so, must not be lost. Driven by that
fear, they took Herculean measures to fight and survive no matter the odds or
the costs. Deterrence was a dialogue of the blind with the deaf.22
In short, there is no guarantee that nuclear deterrence will work under the
intense conditions of escalating conflict. Nuclear weapons do not offer “insu-
rance” against attack, and false confidence that they will automatically deter
could lead a country into very dangerous territory.
The conventional wisdom that “nuclear deterrence works” because it did
in the Cold War must therefore be challenged. This is not to argue that
nuclear weapons had zero effect on Cold War politics. The intellectual, or-
ganisational, and material machinery of nuclear weapons dominated, indeed
defined, the Cold War security paradigm. The presence of vast stockpiles of
nuclear weapons and command-and-control systems ready to progress to a
central apocalyptic nuclear exchange cannot but have sharpened the minds of
policymakers. Nevertheless, the “nuclearisation” of the Cold War in the late
1940s and early 1950s and the massive expansion of nuclear arsenals that
followed does not provide an exclusive, singular explanation for the absence
of direct military conflict between East and West. The “certainty” that nucle-
ar deterrent threats prevented the Cold War turning hot and will continue to
prevent war between the major powers is contestable.23 It is founded on the
assumption that absent such threats the major powers would have “allowed
their various crises to escalate if all they had to fear at the end of the escalato-
ry ladder was something like a repetition of World War II,” as John Mueller
argues.24 Powerful arguments can be made that the sheer scale of destruction
that accompanied World War II through conventional weaponry was suffi-
cient to deter future global war between the major industrialised powers.25 In
fact, Ambassador George Kennan, who in 1946 first articulated the doctrine
of long-term military and political containment of the Soviet Union as part of
a new Cold War, concluded in 1984 that the Soviet Union had no interest in
overrunning Western Europe militarily and that it would not have launched
an attack on Europe in the decades after World War II even if nuclear weap-
ons did not exist.26
Furthermore, the historical track record of nuclear deterrent threats is
mixed at best: nuclear coercion, or “blackmail,” has rarely worked in prac-
tice. A detailed 2013 study on nuclear blackmail concluded, “despite their
extraordinary power, nuclear weapons are uniquely poor instruments of com-
pellance”.27 Jacek Kugler’s study in the mid-1980s of major crises involving
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nuclear powers concluded that nuclear weapons did not “directly affect the
outcomes of extreme crises or deter conflicts” with nuclear or non-nuclear
nations or provide an obvious advantage.28 History also demonstrates that the
possession of nuclear weapons does not prevent regional aggression against
the interests of nuclear weapon states. The Soviet Union, for example, estab-
lished control over Eastern Europe during the period of US nuclear monopo-
ly, North Korea invaded US-backed South Korea in 1950, North Vietnam
fought a nuclear-armed China and United States, Argentina invaded the Falk-
lands/Malvinas in 1982, and Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and launched Scud
missiles against nuclear-armed Israel.29 The late Robin Cook, MP, also sug-
gested,
It is not easy to see what practical return Britain ever got out of the extravagant
sums we invested in our nuclear systems. None of our wars was ever won by
them and none of the enemies we fought was deterred by them. General
Galtieri was not deterred from seizing the Falklands, although Britain pos-
sessed the nuclear bomb and Argentina did not.30
At root is the extreme difficulty of linking the use of nuclear weapons to
any rational system of political means and ends—and the use of nuclear
weapons cannot be divorced from their deployment. The logic of nuclear
deterrence rests on detailed, permanent, and active plans, operational capa-
bilities, organisational infrastructure, and political will to fire nuclear war-
heads at other countries (what Nash called the “bureaucratisation of homi-
cide”31 ). Anthony Burke has eloquently argued that the sheer destructive-
ness of nuclear weapons conflates ostensibly rational practices of nuclear
threat making with deeply emotional dread and raw fear that can generate
intended and unintended outcomes.32 As Alex Wellerstein puts it, “The
method of persuasion is threatening to burn everybody alive”.33 Neverthe-
less, as Burke argues, a powerful “belief in the utility of nuclear weapons,
and in the ability to develop rational and controllable strategies for their use
in deterrence and war” was and remains widespread: “a conviction in the
rationality of nuclear weapons as instruments of the state”. This Cold War
nuclear rationalism obscured the idea that deterrent threats could have the
reverse effect of galvanising resistance for reasons of national pride, domes-
tic politics, or international status.34 This led MccGwire and others to argue
the “self-sustaining complex of assumptions, beliefs and ‘truths’” about nu-
clear deterrence was part of the security problem, not the solution.35
UNSTABLE NUCLEAR RISK
The messy reality of global nuclear politics undermines the comforting story
that nuclear deterrence automatically stabilises crises between nuclear-armed
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opponents, prevents aggression against nuclear-armed states’ vital interests,
or are useful instruments for compellance or crisis management. In fact, the
reverse can apply. The practice of nuclear deterrence has the potential to
foster violent conflict as well as the potential to deter it. In 2015 Michael
Krepon asked, “Can deterrence ever be stable”? He argued that deterrence
stability is a mirage, that nuclear weapons do not create stability and security
but incentivise risk taking and intensify crises. A number of studies have
explored nuclear near misses where the risk of the collapse of conflict into
nuclear violence was worryingly high, not least the Cuban Missile Crisis. 36
There have been incidents where misperception and paranoia could have
pushed humanity over the nuclear brink, such as the Able Archer crisis in
1983. There have been episodes in which the idea that the presence of nucle-
ar weapons makes it somehow “safe” to engage in shooting wars because
nuclear deterrence would prevent escalation has been severely tested, such as
the India-Pakistan Kargil confrontation in 1999.37
Advocates of nuclear deterrence point to the fact that nuclear weapons
have not be used intentionally or by accident since Nagasaki, therefore the
risk of deterrence failing or nuclear weapon systems going badly wrong is
exaggerated. A 2013 study by economist Carl Lundgren in The Nonprolifera-
tion Review dismantles this type of nuclear optimism. Lundgren provides a
Bayesian statistical analysis of the probability of nuclear war arising from
three broad scenarios: an international crisis leading directly to nuclear war;
an accident or misperception leading to nuclear use; and an escalation of a
conventional war to nuclear use. The Bayesian methodology enables statisti-
cians to generate valid probabilities “where only limited data are available
and assured knowledge is not possible, but important conclusions or infer-
ences must still be drawn in order to make choices or set policy”.38 Lund-
gren’s analysis calculates that the “posterior combined risk of nuclear war
during the Cold War [the best estimate after evidence of nuclear crises and
mishaps is observed] was 44.3 per cent” and that “the first sixty-six years of
the nuclear age produced a 61 per cent chance of a nuclear war”.39 He states
that this is equivalent to a 2.1 percent chance per year, or an average frequen-
cy of one nuclear war every forty-seven years. Lundgren highlights research
conducted in the 1980s by political scientist Michael Wallace, mathematician
Linn Sennot, and computer scientist Brian Crissey on the probability of
nuclear war using data from 1978 to 1983 on US false alarms. They arrive at
the conclusion that “there is an almost 50% chance of a war-threatening false
alarm of some type occurring during severe length crisis”, defined as a thirty-
day crisis comparable to the Cuban Missile Crisis.40 Lundgren concludes:
Fighting the Cold War with nuclear armaments and nuclear threats was a
perilous wager. The probability of a failure resulting in nuclear war exceeded
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the probability of making an incorrect call while flipping a coin. The world
must find a way to unwind this desperate gamble.41
The point, here, is to highlight the contingency of nuclear deterrence and
to challenge the narrative that insists nuclear weapons bring certainty, “insu-
rance”, a guarantee of protection, a common understanding amongst all nu-
clear-armed adversaries at all times, and a rational logic of crisis escalation
and control through the supposedly infallible practice of nuclear deterrence.
On the contrary, nuclear deterrence involves relational interaction between
complexes of people, political cultures, organisations, bureaucratic practices,
and military technologies and systems.
The inherent fallibility of nuclear deterrence and the consequences of its
failure by accident or design constitute a considerable societal risk. This is of
paramount concern because even if the probability of something going wrong
with the technology, organisational procedures, or the practice of nuclear
deterrence in a crisis is considered small, the consequences from the deliber-
ate or accidental detonation of even a single nuclear weapon would likely be
catastrophic. Recent evidence suggests that even a relatively modest nuclear
exchange would have devastating effects on the global environment.42 Sup-
porters of nuclear weapons argue that we need not concern ourselves with the
actual use of nuclear weapons because they are designed as “political” weap-
ons never to be used. Their effect is in the deterrence of aggression. That may
be the intent but, as noted above, the effectiveness of a nuclear threat requires
a credible system for use in a crisis. Nuclear deterrence only has to fail once
for a humanitarian catastrophe to ensue. This nuclear gamble as been steadily
“normalised” by some as safe, secure, and benign; it is anything but.
So what could UK nuclear weapons do? The reality is that UK nuclear
deterrent threats only have potential relevance to an extremely narrow set of
scenarios.43 Successive governments’ specific argument is that we need nu-
clear weapons because at some point in the future another nuclear-armed
country such as Russia might seriously threaten the United Kingdom or its
allies with a nuclear or massive conventional attack that could threaten to
bomb this country or its allies past the point of recovery. In such a scenario,
an independent UK threat to retaliate with strategic nuclear weapons might
cause the belligerent to think twice. We might never face such a scenario, but
if we do our possession of nuclear weapons might not prevent disaster and
could equally hasten calamity.
The strategic case for retaining nuclear weapons remains very thin. The
United Kingdom does not face an existential military threat to the survival of
the state and hasn’t done so for about a quarter of a century since the end of
the Cold War (a third of the time the United Kingdom has been nuclear
armed). As Nick Witney, former director-general of International Security
Policy at MoD, noted in 1995,
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A continuing role for nuclear deterrence, however, is not the same thing as a
continuing role for a specifically British nuclear deterrence; and whereas the
general rationale may have survived the end of the Cold War, perhaps weak-
ened but still sustainable, the specifically British one clearly has not.44
NUCLEAR SYMBOLISM AND RESPONDING TO RUSSIA
The uncertainty and instability of nuclear deterrent threats necessitates care-
ful thinking about the relationship between UK nuclear weapons and Russia
in the context of the current Ukraine crisis. The fundamental question is
whether UK nuclear weapons enhance or undermine UK and wider NATO
security. Both positions are ultimately unprovable, but this section outlines a
case for reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the current crisis, including
UK nuclear weapons, based on the very serious long-term risks involved in
embedding a deeply hostile and overtly nuclearized relationship between
Moscow and Europe.
The specific security case for a UK nuclear capability has long rested on
Russia. This has been the case since the end of the Cold War but has taken on
new significance following the annexation of Crimea in 2014.45 This was a
clear violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and a breach
of international law. It has led to civil war in Ukraine’s south and east with
disastrous humanitarian and wider economic effect and exacerbated insecur-
ity in countries bordering Russia, particular the former Soviet republics.
The crisis in Ukraine centred on corruption, cronyism, electoral fraud,
and human aspirations. This set of issues has largely faded from view in the
United Kingdom. It has been replaced by a narrative that understands the
crisis as symptomatic of geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West
with Ukraine as a proxy. The broader context is the deterioration of Russia-
US/NATO relations from the mid 2000s. Russia-US/NATO relations
reached new highs following the 9/11 attacks and the emergence of a com-
mon enemy in Al Qaeda. By the mid 2000s the relationship was deteriorating
significantly, culminating a post–Cold War low with the Russo-Georgia war
in August 2008. This deterioration centred on the further expansion of
NATO in 2004, Russian interpretations of the “colour revolutions” in Geor-
gia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004 to 2005, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 as part of a
Western-conceived conspiracy to drastically reduce Russia’s influence and,
at worst, “a dress rehearsal for installing a pro-U.S. liberal puppet regime in
the Kremlin”46, and deep concern at the brand of neoconservative unilateral-
ism practiced by George W. Bush in his first term. This was captured in
Vladimir Putin’s speech to the Munich Security Conference in 2007:
Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force—military
force—in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss
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of permanent conflicts. As a result, we do not have sufficient strength to find a
comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settle-
ment also becomes impossible. . . . One state and, of course, first and foremost
the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is
visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes
on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?47
The Obama-Medvedev post-Georgia “reset” failed to take hold, and Putin
returned to the presidency determined to restore Russia’s role as an indepen-
dent great power in a “polycentric world”. Russia’s political and economic
resurgence through the 2000s facilitated the Kremlin’s resistance to integra-
tion on Western/US terms that was increasingly framed as Cold War geopo-
litical containment and capitalist encirclement.
UK policy discourse after the annexation of Crimea has coalesced around
themes of Western resistance to Russian chauvinism, traditional interstate
military security, forging consensus within and political cohesion of the Eu-
ropean “West”, and economic punishment and military deterrence. It is a
familiar narrative, fostered energetically by Moscow, which generates and
reproduces enmity through a process of mutual “othering” in which both
sides tend to paint the other as implacably hostile, duplicitous, and danger-
ous. This is part of an intensifying security dilemma in which steps taken to
advance the security of NATO member states or prospective members are
seen as threatening by Moscow, which takes political and military steps to
counter NATO preparations, which reinforces worst-case analyses and
prompts additional steps that cement hostility.48
The problem is that “othering” processes inevitably narrow the set of
options deemed legitimate and acceptable.49 As the European Leadership
Network observed in August 2015:
Russia and NATO both seem to see the new deployments and increased focus
on exercises as necessary corrections of their previous military posture. Each
side is convinced that its actions are justified by the negative changes in their
security environment. Second, an action-reaction cycle is now in play that will
be difficult to stop.50
This is reflected in a series of actions and responses by Russia and NATO
from the expansion of NATO in 2004 to the present. Latest NATO measures
include the outcomes of its summit in Wales in September 2014 (including
the NATO Readiness Action Plan, the NATO Response Force, and its Very
High Readiness Joint Task Force)51, Western sanctions against Russia52, and
a review of nuclear strategy.53 In fact, a number of commentators have
argued for a more forceful response from NATO against what is seen as an
implacable and dangerous enemy that will only respond to military counter-
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threats and enhanced conventional and nuclear deployments and capabil-
ities.54
Russia has deliberately intensified its nuclear weapon operations and
threats in crude attempts at deterrence and intimidation.55 This has taken the
form of a resumption of strategic bomber patrols beginning in 2007, in-
creased nuclear-capable submarine activity, a significant increase in close
military encounters between NATO, Swedish, and Finnish military forces
and Russia56, military exercises simulating a conventional nuclear attack on
Poland as part of the Zapad 2009 exercise57, extensive continental and re-
gional nuclear exercises58, major military exercises in Russia’s Western Mil-
itary District, insistence on the right to deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea 59,
and nuclear threats to European allies, including Denmark in public 60 and the
Baltic states in private (as reported via the “Elbe group” discussions of for-
mer senior US and Russian intelligence professionals61). They are crude
because, as noted above, the historical record suggests nuclear blackmail and
compellance do not work and because serious questions can be asked about
their credibility.
The crisis in Ukraine has been used by UK politicians to reinforce for the
case for Trident replacement as a necessary response to international political
uncertainty generated by Russia.62 Defence Secretary Michael Fallon said in
February 2015 that “Russian aggression is a direct threat to NATO”, that
Moscow had “lowered the threshold” for nuclear use after Crimea, and that
“the main answer to that is to make sure that we modernise our own deter-
rent”.63 Policymakers and MPs have also argued that if Ukraine had retained
its Soviet nuclear missiles and managed to develop an indigenous infrastruc-
ture to safely manage and maintain them then Russia would not have inter-
vened.64 This is a doubtful counterfactual given the interests at stake and
Putin’s deliberate if clumsy strategy of ambiguity, denial, and deception. 65
More broadly, however, the United Kingdom asserts a purely symbolic
role for its nuclear weapons in the current confrontation through two narra-
tives.66 First, an Atlanticist narrative that says the United Kingdom must
share, and be seen to share, “the burden” of the nuclear defence of NATO
with Washington as the United States’ closest military and political ally.67
This narrative has become embedded because UK nuclear weapons are for-
mally assigned to NATO under the 1962 Nassau Agreement that facilitated
the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement (later amended for Trident), and because
the United Kingdom remains dependent on US patronage for continued oper-
ation of its Trident nuclear weapon system.68 The narrative is often justified
by claiming UK nuclear weapons provide “a second centre of decision-mak-
ing” within the Alliance on the use of nuclear weapons and thereby “compli-
cating” the decision making of an adversary.69 Second, a narrative of nuclear
exceptionalism frames the United Kingdom, US, and NATO conventional
and nuclear capabilities as a collective “force for good” in defence of the
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“West” and therefore global security. This narrative says Western nuclear
weapons are good for international peace and security, but those in the hands
of authoritarian states or states beyond the West’s sphere of influence are
illegitimate and undermine international order.70 Continued Western posses-
sion of nuclear weapons is legitimised as an essential bulwark against nonlib-
eral, nondemocratic, nuclear-armed states that might use their nuclear might
to challenge and possibly overturn the Western international order.71
Nevertheless, adducing Russian actions to support an enduring if largely
symbolic case for a pseudo-independent British strategic nuclear capability
on high alert assumes a lot. In worst cases Russian actions are symptomatic
of a revanchist project to reconstruct a pro-Moscow buffer zone of compliant
satellite states underpinned by a resurgent and expansionist bloc ideology of
state capitalism and klepocratic authoritarianism. This does not appear to
capture the centre of gravity of Moscow’s foreign policy in the Georgian and
Ukrainian confrontations and former President Dmitry Medvedev’s assertion
of “privileged interests” in its “near abroad” after the short war with Georgia
in 2008. Rather, it seems symptomatic of a reflexive cultural recourse to a
Cold War explanatory model to account for Russian actions, to categorise the
Ukrainian crisis, to frame appropriate Western responses, and to revalidate
the false certainties of security through nuclear deterrence.72 It is through this
lens that a geostrategic case for Trident is rationalised as an appropriate
response to an enduring and potentially existential military threat to Europe
and the Western liberal international order.
What is required instead is a different reading of the United Kingdom and
NATO security and the role of nuclear weapons in the current conflict over
Ukraine and the broader adversarial context that has developed. This requires
seeing the conflict and Moscow’s “nuclear euphoria”73 for what it is: symp-
tomatic of a Russian narrative of victimhood, resistance, and resurgence and
an almost hypermasculine foreign policy in which nuclear threats are de-
ployed to try to sow political fear abroad and mobilise support at home for
Putin’s autocratic rule through displays of nuclear strength from a position of
political, military, and economic weakness.
Russian and European interests have increasingly diverged, underpinned
by mutually antagonistic (or anxiety-generating) political ideologies that
pitch European liberalism against Putin’s growing authoritarianism. Never-
theless, the evidence does not seem to support a Cold War 2.0 model. Rus-
sian actions, whilst illegal, destabilising, and perilous for the parties in-
volved, seem to reflect an increasingly militant resistance to the encroach-
ment of “the West,” its values and institutions. In that respect it is primarily
defensive, from Moscow’s perspective (though more preemptively so in
Ukraine than Georgia). As Alexei Arbatov has argued, Moscow’s “nuclear
bravado” is a political message to the United States and NATO to refrain
from a military intervention: “It is targeted at the West to impress upon its
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leaders the exceptional importance of this region for Russia’s national secur-
ity interests”.74 It is rooted in a mutual mismanagement of postimperial Rus-
sia’s insecurity after Yeltsin in terms of what sort of state it is and how it
should act. It is an insecurity framed (rightly or wrongly) by a narrative of
post–Cold War humiliation, containment, and attempted assimilation into a
decadent Western hegemony. Righteous, nationalistic, and often xenophobic
resistance facilitated by a resurgent if fragile extraction economy represents
the reassertion of an autonomous Russian identity for the Putin clique.
What is at stake, then, is the stable management of the EU/NATO rela-
tionship with post-Soviet Russia—a delicate and dynamic mix of engage-
ment, integration, reassurance, inclusion, democratisation, and balancing.
This requires acknowledging that the European-Russian relationship is “too
big too fail” and that an exclusionary overt “containment” and militarised
ideological confrontation is to be avoided given the foreseeable mutual long-
term pain and high risk for all involved. This is not to deny Russian threats,
to “appease”, or to encourage Russian adventurism, but to be clear that
careful management of European-Russia relations is essential, that common
interests require cooperation, that Putinism is likely to characterise Russian
politics for some time, that the West’s capacity to contain and deter has
diluted as power has spread in the international system, but that Europe and
the West are nonetheless operating from a position of considerable strength
compared to Moscow.
Here, it is vital to acknowledge agency: we in the “West” have national
and collective choice in how to interpret the current nuclear noise, what we
think Moscow expects to achieve, how we understand “security” in the
present context, and how we might respond. Instead of re-validating the
efficacy of nuclear threats, Russia’s nuclear actions and Western responses
point to the central importance of dialogue for crisis management in the short
term and conflict resolution over the longer term. This speaks to a different
set of priorities that include preventing the collapse of the Ukrainian econo-
my, providing humanitarian and reconstruction support for Ukraine, and
reaching common understandings on nuclear and wider military restraint, all
of which will require some degree of Russian cooperation.75 More broadly, it
requires prioritising investment in “cooperative security efforts aimed at en-
hancing stability, mutual security and predictability through dialogue, reci-
procity, transparency and arms limitations” that have eroded over the past
decade.76 There is certainly a role for ensuring a conventional capacity to
rapidly push back against Russian paramilitary or proxy interventions in
NATO allies but whilst pushing hard on dialogue on Russian security con-
cerns. There seems to be some appreciation of the counterproductive effects
of reciprocating Russia’s nuclear messaging that lend Russian threats undue
credence and political weight and reinforce Russian enemy images. Instead
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the response has been more low key; one of political reassurance to worried
allies based on established commitments and enhanced responsiveness.
From this standpoint it is not clear what constructive role, if any, UK
nuclear deterrent threats have to play, in particular given the very real chal-
lenges and risks involved as detailed in the first part of the chapter. Priority
should be placed on firmly downplaying and delegitimising any role for
nuclear weapons in managing the current confrontation irrespective of Rus-
sia’s nuclear activities. It is not necessary or in the United Kingdom’s,
NATO’s, or the wider “West’s” interests to embed relations with Russia in a
permanently renuclearised confrontation. As Egon Bahr and Gotz Neuneck
argued in 2015:
It is neither intelligent, nor in European interests, to raise again dramatically
the threat of nuclear war. As Ronald Reagan recognised, a nuclear war “cannot
be won and must never be fought”. These weapons’ effects are so overwhelm-
ing and catastrophic that any concept of using them in a “limited” way is
completely disconnected from reality.77
CONCLUSION
This chapter has challenged the nuclear absolutism in UK nuclear weapons
narratives. It has highlighted the inescapable contingency and risk of practic-
ing nuclear deterrence. It argues that the degree of nuclear weapons-induced
stability claimed by deterrence advocates is illusory and constitutes a differ-
ent form of nuclear utopianism; namely, the belief that a stable nuclear order
can be maintained indefinitely by a handful of states that claim unique,
essential, and infallible security benefits from nuclear weapons.78 It chal-
lenges arguments, both explicit and implicit, that nuclear deterrence can
operate impeccably for all time and forever stabilise relations between nucle-
ar-armed states such that the potential for global nuclear relations to spiral
into nuclear conflict is eternally held in check. This is the real fantasy, one
highlighted by profound concerns that nuclear dangers are escalating be-
tween Russia and NATO.79
Furthermore, the chapter has highlighted the very limited and potentially
counterproductive role UK nuclear weapons have to play in responding to
and managing the current crisis with Russia over Ukraine. Clearly one can
accept these contingencies, risks, and limited roles in geopolitical crises and
still firmly support retention of nuclear weapons, but the strategic case be-
comes very thin. Instead, it is legitimate and necessary to ask whether the
deeply contested benefits of nuclear weapons are worth the risk. Most coun-
tries judge they are not. Most countries concur that nuclear weapons are a
source of risk, rather than some form of insurance against security risks.
Most countries strongly advocate concrete steps towards nuclear disarma-
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ment. Such efforts have been consistently hampered by nuclear-armed states
operating in a security paradigm that is seemingly dependent on their indefi-
nite retention of nuclear weapons.80 This security paradigm is being repro-
duced by Russian and to a lesser extent by NATO nuclear activities.
The chapter argues that the lack of any role for UK nuclear weapons is
because the current crisis is symptomatic of a broader set of challenges of
political and economic development and transition in post-Soviet states, in-
cluding Russia. It is grappling with this set of challenges that will shape our
security. This encompasses a set of difficult and long-term issues that can
often get relegated because they are rooted in human security and develop-
ment rather than military state security and Western conceptions of interstate
order. Preventing the collapse of the Ukrainian economy and aiding postwar
reconstruction, reconciliation, and demilitarisation are clear but difficult
long-term security priorities that will invariably require Russian involvement
and cooperation. Moreover, this type of crisis is not new, and they raise a
broader set of questions about the relationship between Russian aspirations
and interests and realizing a sustainable set of European security understand-
ings and practices. Like it or not, it is clear that Russia is integral to a stable
European security environment and that it is counterproductive to dismiss its
security concerns as wholly illegitimate. The question, then, is one of how:
How can we work collectively with what may well remain a semiauthoritar-
ian Russia over the next decade or two to build a mutually acceptable Euro-
pean security environment, even accepting that Russian political practices
are at odds with European liberalism? What do we think that might look like
over that time period building on Cold War and post–Cold War successes
and failures? This is speaking to a set of intrinsic problems that entangle
regional interstate order and human security needs and aspirations.
Rather than investing in nuclear weapons and perpetuating a dangerous
nuclear security paradigm, enlightened self-interest recognises the impera-
tives of cooperative security to address regional and global security chal-
lenges and long-term diplomatic investment in the arduous tasks of inter- and
intrastate conflict resolution.
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